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Abstract 
The paper seeks to identify concepts and theories to analyze and explain the relationship 
between the Member States and the European Union. It mainly adopts a top-down 
perspective looking at how the European Union has affected the Member States and to what 
extent it has changed their domestic institutions, policies and political processes. What is the 
effect of the European Union on the Member States? The paper reviews the existing 
literature, which offers different insights on each of the three questions. While by now most 
students of the European Union agree that its effect on the Member States is differential, 
there is still little consensus on how to account for variation in the processes, degrees and 
the outcomes of domestic change. Nor has the literature paid much attention to how the 
Member States have responded to the increasing effect of the European Union on their 
domestic institutions, policies and political processes. The paper therefore concludes with 
some considerations on how to conceptualize the feedback loops between ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ dynamics in the relationship between the EU and its Member States. 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Papier diskutiert Konzepte und Theorien, mit deren Hilfe sich die Beziehung zwischen 
der Europäischen Union und ihren Mitgliedstaaten untersuchen läßt. Im Mittelpunkt steht die 
Frage, inwieweit die Europäische Union die politischen Institutionen, Prozesse und 
Politikinhalte auf der nationalen Ebene verändert hat. Während sich die Literatur mittlerweile 
weitgehend einig ist, dass die innerstaatliche Wirkung der Europäisierung erheblich variieren 
kann, gibt es immer noch keinen Konsens, wie sich solche Varianzen am besten erklären 
lassen. Auch die Versuche der Mitgliedsstaaten, auf die durch die Europäisierung induzierten 
Veränderungen im EU-Entscheidungsprozess zu reagieren, haben bisher nur wenig Beach-
tung gefunden. Das Papier schließt deshalb mit einigen Überlegungen, wie sich solche 
„Rückkopplungseffekte” konzeptionell fassen lassen. 
Keywords 
Europeanization, domestic impact of Europe, institutional change, misfit, convergence/divergence 
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1. Introduction 
This paper seeks to identify concepts and theories to analyse and explain the relationship 
between the Member States and the European Union. While acknowledging that the 
relationship between the Member States and the European Union is an interactive one, most 
of the literature focuses one side of the equation. European level processes are ‘bracketed’ 
to analyze their effects at the member-state level or vice versa.  
For a long time, European studies have been mostly concerned with the ‘bottom-up’ 
dimension of the EU-Member State relationship exploring the role of the Member States in 
the European institution-building process. In recent years, however, there is an emerging 
‘top-down’ literature analyzing the effect of the evolving European system of governance on 
the Member States (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; 
Goetz and Hix 2000). 1 A comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the 
Member States and the European Union requires the systematic integration of the two 
dimensions. Nevertheless, this paper will mainly adopt a top-down perspective looking at 
how the European Union has affected the Member States and to what extent it has changed 
their domestic institutions, policies and political processes. More specifically, three questions 
will be addressed:  
1) Where does the European Union affect the Member States (dimensions of domestic 
change)?  
2) How does the European Union affect the Member States (mechanisms of domestic 
change)? 
3) What is the effect of the European Union on the Member States (outcome of domestic 
change)? 
The paper will review the existing literature, which offers different insights on each of the 
three questions. While by now most students of the European Union agree that its effect on 
the Member States is differential, there is still little consensus on how to account for variation 
in the processes, degrees and the outcomes of domestic change. Nor has the literature paid 
much attention to how the Member States have responded to the increasing effect of the 
European Union on their domestic institutions, policies and political processes. The paper 
                                                 
1  Part of the literature refers to the effect of the European Union on the Member States as ‘Europeanization’ 
(Ladrech 1994; Radaelli 2000). Others reserve the term Europeanization for the ‘emergence and the 
development at the European level of distinc t structures of governance’ (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). 
On the various concepts of Europeanization see Börzel and Risse 2000; Olsen 2002). 
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will therefore conclude with some considerations on how to conceptualize the feedback 
loops between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics in the relationship between the EU and 
its Member States. 
Figure 1: The Relationship between the EU and its Member States: Bottom-up and 
Top-Down 
  
 
 
 
 
2. From Bottom-up to Top-Down 
For decades, research in the field of European Studies adopted a ‘bottom-up’ perspective in 
analyzing the relationship between the European Union and its Member States. The 
literature was mainly concerned with how to conceptualize and explain processes and 
outcomes of European integration. Theoretical debates were dominated by two competing 
paradigms of European integration that significantly disagree on the role that Member States 
play at the European level (for the intellectual history of the debate see e.g. Caporaso and 
Keeler 1993). Intergovernmentalist approaches take the Member States and their 
governments as the principal agents driving European integration and policy-making to 
protect their geopolitical interests and the economic concerns of their constituencies 
(Hoffmann 1982; Taylor 1991; Moravcsik 1991; Moravcsik 1998). Neofunctionalism and 
multi-level governance approaches, by contrast, privilege domestic interests (such as 
business associations, trade unions, and regions) that press for further integration to 
promote their economic or political interests, as well as supranational actors (particularly the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice) that seek to increase the power 
of European institutions over the Member States (Haas 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001).  
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In the 1990s, students of European integration became increasingly interested in the impact 
of European processes and institutions on the Member States. The first studies focused on 
the consequences of European integration for the autonomy and authority of the Member 
States. In order to theorize the domestic impact of Europe, the explanatory logics of the two 
major paradigms of European integration were essentially turned around. If 
intergovernmentalist approaches were correct in assuming that member-state governments 
controlled European integration while supranational institutions themselves exercised little 
independent effect, the power of the Member States would not be challenged. Rather, 
European integration should enhance the control of national governments over domestic 
affairs since it removed issues from domestic controversy into the arena of executive control 
at the European level (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1994). Proponents of neofunctionalist or 
supranationalist approaches suggested exactly the opposite, namely that the European 
Union provided domestic actors, such as regions and interest groups, with independent 
channels of political access and influence at the European level enabling them to circumvent 
or by-pass their Member States in the European policy process (Marks 1993; Marks, 
Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Sandholtz 1996). Between the two competing paradigms, a third 
group of scholars emerged that rejected the zero-sum game conception of the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States, in which one level was to be empowered at the 
expense of the other. They argued that the different levels of government would become 
increasingly dependent on each other in European policy-making. As a result, European 
integration would neither strengthen nor weaken but transform the Member States by 
fostering the emergence of cooperative relationships between state and non-state actors at 
the various levels of government (Kohler-Koch 1996; Rhodes 1997; Kohler-Koch and Eising 
1999). 
Despite a general disagreement on the concrete impact of European integration, most of the 
earlier studies expected to see some kind of convergence among the Member States either 
leading to more centralization, decentralization or cooperation in the national political 
systems. Such convergence was expected to result from a redistribution of power resources 
among national governments and domestic actors, with some gaining new opportunities to 
pursue their interests while others being constrained in their action capacities (Börzel 2002b: 
18–22). Yet, empirical studies on the domestic impact of Europe found little evidence for 
convergence. Moreover, they identified alternative mechanisms of domestic change that 
worked through the internalization of new norms, rules, and shared practices rather than 
changes in political opportunity structures (Mény, Muller, and Quermonne 1996; Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse 2001).  
Integration theories are inadequate to account for the differential impact of Europe on the 
Member States. Their major concern has been to explain the dynamics and outcomes of the 
European integration process rather than its domestic effects, which appear to fall more into 
the realm of comparative politics and public policy. The European Union was traditionally 
seen as the preserve of international relations. But with the establishment of the Single 
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Market and the European Monetary Union propelling the delegation of domestic 
competencies to the European level, the disciplinary boundary became increasingly porous 
(Risse-Kappen 1996; Hix 1999). Comparativists could no longer ignore the effects of the 
European Union on the domestic institutions, policies and political processes of the Member 
States. As we will see in the following sections, comparative politics and public policy offer a 
more fine-grained analytical toolbox to trace processes and outcomes of domestic change as 
a consequence of European integration and EU policy-making.  
3. Studying the Effect of the European Union on the 
Member States 
3.1 Dimensions of Domestic Change 
The analytical tool-box of comparative politics and public policy provides three main 
categories which allow to analyze the effect of the European Union on its Member States and 
to trace processes of domestic change: polity, policy, and. 
Figure 2: Dimensions of Domestic Change: Polity, Policy, and Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While it is useful to analytically distinguish between the three dimensions of domestic 
change, reality is more complex. European policies, processes and institutions tend to affect 
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closely linked to legal and administrative structures and patterns of interest intermediation 
(Héritier et al. 2001; Knill 2001). 
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3.2. Mechanisms of Domestic Change 
The literature has identified several mechanisms through which Europe can affect the 
Member States. Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl distinguish between institutional 
compliance, where the EU prescribes a particular model which is ‘imposed’ on the Member 
States, changing domestic opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of resources 
between domestic actors, and policy framing, which alters the beliefs of domestic actors 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Knill 2001; on framing see also Radaelli 2000; Kohler-Koch 1996). 
Others emphasize judicial review, i.e. the right of any affected party to challenge deficient 
implementation of Community Law before national courts (Weiler 1991; Conant 2001). A 
more indirect mechanism of domestic change is regulatory competition, triggered by the 
dismantling of trade barriers, which provides firms with exit options from national jurisdictions 
(Sun and Pelkmans 1995; Kerwer and Teutsch 2001).  
The different causal mechanisms of domestic change can be grouped around two theoretical 
approaches that draw on different strands of neo-institutionalist reasoning: rationalist 
institutionlism and sociological institutionalism. There is a third body of literature that has 
been referred to as organizational ecology. While it will be discussed separately, I will argue 
that the theoretical arguments can be largely subsumed under the other two approaches. 
The three approaches pose different propositions on when and how Europe affects the 
Member States and what the consequences are (see figure 7 below).2 Yet, they share two 
major assumptions:  
1) The impact of Europe on the Member States is differential, i.e. varies across Member 
States and policy areas. 
2) The differential impact of Europe is explained by the ‘goodness of fit’ between 
European and national policies, institutions, and processes, on the one hand, and the 
existence of ‘mediating factors ’ or intervening variables that filter the domestic impact of 
Europe, on the other hand. 
Inconvenient Europe: Misfit as the Necessary Conditions of Domestic Change 
Irrespective of the theoretical approach chosen, most studies find that there must be some 
‘misfit’ (Börzel 1999; Duina 1999) or ‘mismatch’ (Héritier 1996) between European and 
domestic policies, processes, and institutions. The ‘goodness of fit’ (Risse, Cowles, and 
Caporaso 2001) or congruence between the European and the domestic level determines 
the degree of pressure for adaptation generated by Europeanization on the Member States. 
                                                 
2  The following two sections draw on Börzel and Risse 2001, 2003, and Börzel 2002b; see also Risse, Cowles, 
and Caporaso 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Héritier et al. 2001. 
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Only if European policies, institutions, and/or processes differ significantly from those found 
at the domestic level, Member States feel the need to change. The lower the compatibility 
between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher is the 
adaptational pressure Europe exerts on the Member States.  
There are two types of misfits by which Europe exerts adaptational pressure on the Member 
States. First, European policies might cause a ‘policy misfit’ between European rules and 
regulations, on the one hand, and domestic policies, on the other (cf. Héritier, Knill, and 
Mingers 1996; Schmidt 2001; Börzel 2003). Here, policy misfits essentially equal compliance 
problems. European policies can challenge national policy goals, regulatory standards, the 
instruments used to achieve policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving approach. 
Member state resistance to adapt domestic policies usually results in violations against 
European legal requirements (Börzel 2003). Policy misfit can also exert adaptational 
pressure on underlying institutions and political processes. 
Second, Europe can cause ‘institutional misfit’ challenging domestic rules and procedures 
and the collective understandings attached to them.3 European rules and procedures, which 
give national governments privileged decision powers vis-à-vis other domestic actors, 
conflict with the territorial institutions of highly decentralized Member States which grant their 
regions autonomous decision powers (Börzel 2002b). The accessibility of the European 
Commission for societal interests challenges the statist business-government relations in 
France and the corporatist system of interest mediation in Germany (Cowles 2001). Europe 
might even threaten deeply entrenched collective understandings of national identity as it 
touches upon constitutive norms such as state sovereignty (Risse 2001; Checkel 2001). The 
degree of institutional fit has also implications for the ‘bottom-up’ dimension of the EU-
Member State relations. Thus, Bulmer and Katzenstein argue that the congruence in 
‘constitutional order’, ‘norms and conventions’, and ‘patterns of meso-level governance’ 
between Germany and the EU has allowed Germany to play a leading role in shaping 
supranational institution-building and the making of European policies (Bulmer 1997; 
Katzenstein 1997), which in turn has reduced adaptational pressures on its domestic 
institutions, processes and policies. While these findings have been contested (Risse, 
Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Héritier et al. 2001; Börzel 2003), they point to an important 
feedback loop between top-down and the bottom-up processes to which I will return in the 
concluding section. 
Some studies have questioned the explanatory power of the goodness of fit. First, Knill and 
Lehmkuhl argue that the relevance of misfit is limited to the EU’s market-correcting policies, 
                                                 
3  For a more fine-tuned definition, which breaks institutional misfit down into three sub-categories (constitutional, 
cultural, and functional) see Hansen and Scholl 2002. Others have distinguished between misfit concerning the 
core as opposed to the periphery of domestic institutions (Knill and Lenschow 2001a; Knill 2001).  
I H S — Tanja A. Börzel / How the European Union Interacts with its Member States — 7 
such as environmental regulations, which positively prescribe or impose a concrete model 
for domestic compliance. Market-making policies, by contrast (e.g. transport liberalization) 
would leave the Member States too much flexibility and discretion in order to exert pressure 
for adaptation; instead they would provide domestic actors with new opportunities for 
achieving domestic reforms (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Schmidt 2001). Yet, a European 
policy can only empower domestic actors if there is a certain misfit with domestic regulations. 
Accordingly, it is not only ‘integration through law’ that can produce misfit at the domestic 
level. Softer forms of integration in the ‘shadow of law’ or ‘without law’, such as the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC, Héritier 2002), may equally challenge domestic institutions, 
policies, and processes inducing processes of social learning (Dyson forthcoming), or 
empowering domestic reform coalitions (Anderson, K. forthcoming). 
Second, Héritier et al. criticize the static perspective, which ignores that the goalposts of 
goodness of fit may change over time depending on the stage of the national policy process. 
Even if European policies initially fit domestic regulations, they may empower domestic 
actors to introduce changes that go against European requirements resulting in ‘ex -post’ 
misfit. For instance, France had already deregulated its transport sector when it met the EU 
demands for liberalization. But the latter strengthened those domestic actors that pushed for 
re-regulating the impact of liberalization in order to safeguard public interest goals (Héritier et 
al. 2001). The French case may indeed call for a more dynamic perspective that looks at the 
relation between the EU and its Member States over time rather than taking a snap shot 
picture at a given point of time (Goetz 2000; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). Such a 
dynamic perspective would also allow to account for the recursive dimension of the domestic 
impact of Europe, where Member States respond to European pressures by trying to 
(re)shape European policies and institutions in order to reduce the misfit (see below). 
A third criticism, finally, focuses on the fragility of domestic institutions. If they are in a 
performance crisis or in endogenous transition, domestic institutions may not be sufficiently 
robust in order to be challenged by European policies, processes, and institutions (Morlino 
1999; Knill and Lenschow 2001a). This applies, in particular, to the Southern European 
Member States and the Central and Eastern European accession countries, where EU 
membership has been associated with institution-building rather than institutional change. 
Nevertheless, domestic actors are socialized into new norms and values redefining their 
identities. Similarly, EU accession may provide new resources (money, expertise, ideas, 
legitimacy) that empower domestic actors to overcome crisis and shape the transition 
process, respectively (Grabbe 2003). 
Most studies take misfit only as a necessary condition of domestic change. They identify 
intervening variables that mediate between European pressures for adaptation and member 
state responses. Depending on the theoretical approach chosen, however, the literature 
emphasizes different ‘mediating factors’. 
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The Domestic Impact of Europe as a Process of Redistributing Resources 
Resource-dependency approaches are usually based on some sort of rationalist 
institutionalism, which assumes that actors are rational, goal-oriented, and purposeful (cf. 
Hall and Taylor 1996). Rational actors follow a ‘logic of consequentialism’ (March and Olsen 
1989, 1998) in the sense that they have a fixed and ordered set of preferences and they act 
instrumentally in order to maximize their expected utilities by deploying the resources at their 
disposal. As any individual or corporate actor is dependent on others to achieve his or her 
goals, actors have to exchange their resources to produce desired outcomes. The resource 
exchange is based on the mutual assessment of resources, strategies, and interests. Actors 
will engage in strategic interaction using their resources to maximize influence over 
outcomes, while trying to become as little dependent as possible on the others with whom 
they interact. The strategy by which actors seek to maximize their utilities, i.e. the decision 
with which actors they exchange what kind of resources, depends on the availability and 
relative value of their own resources, as well as the estimated value of the resources and the 
anticipated ex change behaviour (interests and strategies) of others.  
Rationalist institutionalism views social institutions, including the EU, as external constraints 
on the behaviour of actors with given identities and preferences. From this perspective, 
Europe is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure which offers some 
actors additional legal and political resources to exert influence, while severely constraining 
the ability of others to pursue their goals (Héritier et al. 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Kohler-
Koch and Eising 1999). Such changes in the political opportunities and constraints for 
domestic actors can result in a redistribution of resources among them, empowering some 
over others. The ‘differential empowerment’ may not only alter domestic institutions but also 
change domestic policies and political processes.  
While earlier works suggested that European integration favours a particular groups of 
domestic actors, e.g. governments, over others, e.g. regions and interest groups, or vice 
versa (see above), empirical evidence clearly shows that the effect of the European political 
opportunity structure varies significantly. For instance, while French firms gained more 
autonomy vis-à-vis their national government by circumventing them in the European policy 
process (Schmidt 1996), Spanish firms did not (Aguilar Fernandez 1993). The Italian regions 
have been far less able to ascertain their domestic power vis-à-vis the central state than their 
Austrian or British counterparts (Jeffery 1997). 
The European political opportunity structure only leads to a redistribution of resources and 
differential empowerment at the domestic level if, first, there is considerable misfit, which 
provides actors with new opportunities and constraints. And second, the literature has 
identified two mediating factors that influence the capacities of domestic actors to exploit 
new opportunities and avoid constraints with opposite effects: multiple veto players and 
facilitating formal institutions. 
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Despite the pressure to adapt ‘misfitting’ domestic institutions and policies to European 
requirements, the existence of multiple veto points can empower domestic actors with 
diverse interests to avoid constraints and, thus, effectively inhibit domestic adaptation 
(Tsebelis 1995; Haverland 2000; Héritier et al. 2001). The more power is dispersed across 
the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision-making, the more 
difficult it is to foster the domestic ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce changes in 
response to Europeanization pressures. A large number of institutional or factual veto 
players thus impinges on the capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy changes and 
qualifies their empowerment. The European liberalization of the transport sector, for 
example, empowered societal and political actors in highly regulated Member States, which 
had been unsuccessfully pushing for privatization and deregulation. But while the German 
reform coalition was able to exploit European policies to overcome domestic opposition to 
liberalization, Italian trade unions and sectoral associations successfully blocked any reform 
attempt (Héritier et al. 2001). 
Existing facilitating formal institutions can provide actors with material and ideational 
resources necessary to exploit European opportunities and thus promote domestic 
adaptation (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). The European political opportunity 
structure may offer domestic actors additional resources. But they are not able to deploy 
them when they lack the necessary action capacity. Direct relations with European decision-
makers provide regions with the opportunity to circumvent their central government in 
European policy-making. But many regions do not have sufficient resources (manpower, 
money, expertise) to be permanently present at the European level and, thus, to exploit the 
new opportunities. In the UK, public agencies and related complementary institutions helped 
women’s organizations with the means to use EU equal pay and equal treatment directives 
in furthering gender equality. In the absence of such a formal institution, French women were 
not able to overcome domestic resistance to implement the EU equal pay and equal 
treatment policies (Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Tesoka 1999).  
A low number of veto points and the existence of facilitating formal institutions determine 
whether policy and institutional misfit lead to a redistribution of resources and the differential 
empowerment of domestic actors as a result of which domestic processes, policies, and 
institutions get changed.  
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Figure 3: The Domestic Impact of Europe as a Process of Redistributing Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Domestic Impact of Europe as a Process of Socialization 
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the less likely they are to produce domestic change. The idea of cooperative governance 
emulated by the European Commission fits German cooperative federalism but challenges 
statist policy-making practices in Italy and Greece (Kohler-Koch 1998a). Yet, cognitive or 
normative misfit does not necessarily result in domestic change. Domestic actors and 
institutions often resist change despite significant pressure for adaptation. 
Again, two mediating factors account for the degree to which misfit leads to processes of 
socialization by which actors internalize new norms and develop new identities: norm 
entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions. 
Norm entrepreneurs mobilize at the domestic level to persuade actors to redefine their 
interests and identities in light of the new norms and rules by engaging them in processes of 
social learning. There are two types of norm- and idea-promoting agents. Epistemic 
communities are networks of actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge and a 
normative agenda (Haas 1992). They legitimate new norms and ideas by providing scientific 
knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships. In case of the single currency, the coalition 
of central bankers and national technocrats successfully advocated a monetarist approach 
which produced dramatic changes in domestic monetary policy, even in countries like Italy 
and Greece which had to undergo painful adaptation (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; 
Radaelli 1998). Advocacy or principled issue networks are bound together by shared beliefs 
and values rather than by consensual knowledge (Keck and Sikkink 1998). They appeal to 
collectively shared norms and identities in order to persuade other actors to reconsider their 
goals and preferences. Such processes of complex or ‘double-loop’ learning (Agyris and 
Schön 1980), in which actors change their interests and identities as opposed to merely 
adjusting their means and strategies, occur rather rarely. While persuasion and social 
learning are mostly identified with processes of policy change, they can also have an effect 
on domestic institutions. As Checkel argues, Germany underwent a profound and 
constitutive change of its citizenship norms resulting from a learning process instigated by an 
advocacy network (Checkel 2001). And Kohler-Koch shows how the European Commission 
as an ‘ideational entrepreneur’ seeks to socialize domestic actors into new practices of 
cooperative governance by involving them in the formulation and implementation of 
European policies through transnational networks (Kohler-Koch 1998b; 1999). 
A cooperative political culture and other cooperative informal institutions  exist which are 
conducive to consensus-building and burden-sharing. Informal institutions entail collective 
understandings of appropriate behaviour that strongly influence the ways in which domestic 
actors respond to Europeanization pressures. First, a consensus-oriented or cooperative 
decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple veto points by rendering their use for 
actors inappropriate. Cooperative federalism prevented the German Länder from vetoing any 
of the European Treaty revisions, which deprived them of core decision powers (Börzel 
2002b). Likewise, the litigational culture of Germany encouraged its citizens to appeal to 
national courts for the deficient application of Community Law, while such a culture was 
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absent in France where litigation is much lower (Conant 2001). Second, a consensus-
oriented political culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs, which facilitates the 
accommodation of pressure for adaptation. Rather than shifting adaptational costs upon a 
social or political minority, the ‘winners’ of domestic change compensate the ‘losers’. The 
consensual corporatist decision-making culture in the Netherlands and Germany facilitated 
the liberalization of the transport sector by offering compensation to the employees as the 
potential losers of the domestic changes (Héritier et al. 2001). Likewise, Vivien Schmidt 
shows that a particular discourse may also enhance the capacity of domestic actors to 
impose or negotiate adaptations to European requirements (Schmidt 2000). Cognitive 
arguments about the logic and necessity of new policies and institutional change serve 
relevant actors to legitimate costly adaptations and increase their acceptance. While an 
‘ideational discourse’ facilitates the adoption of reform decisions, ‘interactive discourse’ helps 
to communicate these decisions to the general public.  
A recent study looking at the domestic impact of Europe on the German parliament argues, 
however, that cooperative informal institutions may impair rather than facilitate domestic 
change. The ‘permissive consensus’, which has existed in the Federal Republic of Germany 
since the late 1950s, when all major parties had coalesced around both the economic and 
political dimension of the European integration project, has prevented the German 
parliament from adapting its scrutiny procedures to the requirements of European policy-
making and from making effective use of their participatory rights (Hansen and Scholl 2002). 
While the argument is plausible, it refers to a substantive pro-integrationist consensus 
among German elites rather than collectively shared understandings and beliefs (informal 
institutions) about cooperation and consensus-seeking as appropriate behaviour in public 
policy-making. 
The existence of norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions affects whether 
European ideas, norms and the collective understandings, which do not resonate with those 
at the domestic level, are internalized by domestic actors giving rise to domestic change.  
Figure 4:  The Domestic Impact of Europe as a Process of Socialization 
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The Domestic Impact of Europe as a Process of Institutional Adaptation 
Institutional adaptation draws on organizational theory. It refers to the ‘long-term substitution 
of existing practices and structures with new ones’ (Olsen 1997: 159). Organizational theory 
identifies different causal mechanisms through which institutional adaptation can evolve. Like 
socialization approaches, institutional adaptation adopts a sociological institutionalist 
understanding of actors’ behaviour and the nature of institutions (Powell and DiMaggio 
1991). But its explanations follow a more structuralist reasoning emphasizing processes of 
institutional isomorphism. Institutions that frequently interact, are exposed to each other or 
are located in a similar environment develop similarities over time in formal organizational 
structures, principles of resource allocation, practices, meaning structures, and reform 
patterns (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1991). This poses serious problems 
in explaining variation in institutional adaptation to a similar environment.  
Some sociological institutionalists have addressed this problem by pointing at the 
‘inefficiency of history’ in matching institutional practices and structures to environments and 
reforms (March and Olsen 1989: 54–56, March and Olsen 1995: 40–44). Institutions develop 
robustness towards changes in their functional and normative environments. First, 
institutional adaptation is path dependent. Existing institutions are not simply to be replaced 
or harmonized with new rules, norms, and practices. Profound and abrupt transformation, 
with a sudden elimination and replacement of established practices, meanings, and resource 
allocations, should be only expected under special circumstances (Olsen 1997: 162). 
Second, the more new institutional rules, norms, and practices are institutionalized, and the 
more they ‘match’ the constituting principles of already existing institutions (goodness of fit), 
the more likely are institutions to incorporate these new rules, norms, and practices (Olsen 
1997: 161). Variation in institutional adaptation is explained by the different degrees to which 
new and existing institutions match each other. If institutional isomorphism is to evolve, it is 
the result of a long-term process in which some institutions have to undergo deeper change 
than others do. 
Institutional adaptation approaches also view European institutions as new norms, rules, 
practices, and structures of meaning, which are diffused to the Member States. Institutional 
isomorphism points to four diffusion mechanisms, which can result in domestic change 
(Olsen 2002; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000): 
– Coercion: The EU positively prescribes or imposes a model with which the Member 
States have to comply, e.g. European monetary integration that requires the Member 
States to meet certain macro-economic targets related to public deficits, debt, and 
inflation rates and make their central banks independent (Dyson 2000). 
– Mimetic imitation and normative pressure: Member States emulate a model 
recommended by the EU to avoid uncertainty (mimesis) or has been successfully 
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implemented by other states (normative pressure) as it happened in the liberalization 
of the telecommunication sector, where Member States have introduced independent 
regulatory agencies that monitor, license, and regulate (Schneider 2001). 
– Competitive selection (regulatory competition): while the EU does neither impose nor 
recommend a model, Member States compete for the most efficient domestic 
arrangements in order to avoid comparative disadvantages. Transport liberalization 
policies, for instance, by which the EU demands the Member States to open their 
market to non-resident competitors, do not say how a liberalized market is to be 
governed. But EU liberalization puts pressure on Member States to change their 
market regulations in order to avoid regulatory burdens restricting the competitiveness 
of their domestic industry (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001). 
– Framing: European actors can behave as ‘ideational entrepreneurs’, trying to alter the 
beliefs and expectations of domestic actors by disseminating new ideas and concepts, 
such as the principle of cooperative governance, which the Commission propagated in 
order to improve European regional development (Kohler-Koch 2002). 
Figure 5: The Domestic Impact of Europe as a Process of Institutional Adaptation 
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work through processes of social learning, often induced by norm or ideational 
entrepreneurs, which seek to persuade domestic actors to alter their beliefs and interests in 
response to European requirements. 
Subsuming institutional adaptation under the other two approaches also allows to account 
for variation beyond the ‘goodness of fit’ since the isomorphism literature has failed to specify 
mediating factors that help explain why domestic institutions facing similar degrees of misfit 
still vary with regard to the outcome of domestic change. This is all the more true since the 
different processes or mechanisms of domestic change are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. Mediating factors often occur simultaneously reinforcing their effects but 
at times also pulling in different directions (Hansen and Scholl 2002). Or they characterize 
different phases in processes of change. Future research has to figure out how the causal 
mechanisms relate to each other (Börzel and Risse 2003; Olsen 2002). 
3.3. Outcome of Domestic Change 
While we have rather specific ideas about when and how Europe affects the Member States, 
we know less about outcomes, that is, the scope and direction of domestic change.  
Deep Impact? The Scope of Domestic Change 
The literature broadly distinguishes between five different outcomes regarding the scope or 
degree of change (Héritier et al. 2001; Radaelli 2000; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). 
– Inertia 
Inertia refers to the absence of change. This is not the result of a fit between European 
and domestic policies, institutions, and processes that may reaffirm existing 
arrangements. Rather, Member States resist the adaptations necessary to meet 
European requirements. Resistance to change often leads to non-compliance with 
European legislation against which the European Commission can open infringement 
proceedings, thereby increasing the pressure for adaptation (Börzel 2001). 
– Retrenchment 
Resistance to change may have the paradoxical effect of increasing rather than 
decreasing misfits between the European and the domestic level. Italy not only resisted 
the changes necessary to liberalize its transport market. Instead of liberalization, the 
Italian government has increased intervention (Kerwer 2001). 
– Absorption 
Member States incorporate European requirements into their domestic institutions and 
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policies without substantial modifications of existing structures and the logic of political 
behaviour. The degree of change is low.  
– Accommodation 
Member States accommodate European pressure by adapting existing processes, 
policies and institutions in their periphery without changing core features and the 
underlying collective understandings attached to them (Knill 2001). One way of doing 
this is by ‘patching up’ new policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing 
the latter (Héritier 2001). The degree of domestic change is modest. 
– Transformation 
Member States replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, 
substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their core features 
and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed. The 
degree of domestic change is high, affecting the core of system-wide political, 
economic and social structures (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001: 15), such as the 
constitutional balance of power between domestic institutions, the political culture of a 
country or macro-economic policies and the currencies of the Member States. 
Figure 6: The Scope of Domestic Change 
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Transformation should only occur under exceptional circumstances, such as performance 
crises (Olsen 1996) or powerful norm entrepreneurs supported by some coercive pressures 
in the form of sanctions (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
Figure 7: Approaches to the Domestic Impact of Europe in Comparison 
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Coming Together or Driving Apart? The Direction of Domestic Change 
Is Europe making the Member States more similar? The literature has found little evidence 
for a homogenization or convergence of domestic institutions, policies, and processes 
toward common models and approaches (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Héritier et al. 
2001; Anderson 2002). This does not mean that Europe has no effect on the Member States. 
Its domestic impact is not the same as convergence. Europe may cause convergence 
(Schneider 2001; Harcourt 2003) but in most cases it rather does not. This is not too 
surprising if we accept that the effect of European policies, institutions, and processes is 
filtered through existing domestic institutions, policies and interests. The number of veto 
points, supporting formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs, and cooperative informal 
institutions mediate between European pressures for adaptation and the outcome of 
domestic change. We should expect at best some ‘clustered convergence’ among Member 
States facing similar pressures for adaptation because similar actors are empowered and are 
likely to learn from each other in searching effective ways of responding to European 
pressures (Börzel 1999). Institutional adaptation approaches appear to lean more towards 
convergence since they draw on arguments about institutional isomorphism (see figure 7). 
Institutions that frequently interact are expected to become more alike. Yet, institutional 
isomorphism only evolves over time and is mediated through institutional path 
dependencies, even though the concept is not clearly specified, e.g. by identifying mediating 
factors (see above).  
Despite its differential impact, however, Europe has not caused divergence among the 
Member States either, driving them further apart. There are no indications that member state 
variation in their domestic institutions and policies has increased. 4 The dominant finding is 
persistence and diversity that needs to be explained. Consequently, measuring convergence 
and divergence may be of limited use in analyzing the domestic impact of Europe, 
particularly since answers vary according to the level at which one looks for convergence or 
divergence (Knill and Lenschow 2001b).  
Finally, the convergence we observe does not necessarily originate at the European level 
(Schneider 2001; Schmidt 2001). This also applies to domestic change in general. Europe is 
not always the driving force but complements and enhances trends that were already 
affecting the Member States. We have to employ counterfactuals and test for alternative 
explanations (Schmitter 1999: 296–297; Goetz 2000: 225–228). Globalization appears to be 
the major rival for Europeanization in driving domestic change. While some studies have 
attempted to separate effects of Europeanization and globalization (Verdier and Breen 2001; 
Schneider 2001), it is often difficult to isolate the ‘net effect’ of Europe and to disentangle it 
                                                 
4  Convergence in general is defined by a decreasing variation in the relevant indicators (Martin and Simmons 
1998; cf. Unger and van Waarden 1995). 
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from other sources of domestic change not only at the global, but also at the national and 
local level (Anderson, J. forthcoming). 
Tracing the causes, processes and outcomes of domestic change becomes even more 
‘muddled’ if we seek to account for the interactive and recursive nature of the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States. 
4.  Bringing the Bottom-up Perspective Back In: Up-
Loading and Down-Loading 
The relationship between the EU and its Member States is not a one-way street. Member 
States are not merely passive receivers of European demands for domestic change. They 
may proactively shape European policies, institutions, and processes to which they have to 
adapt later (Bomberg and Peterson 2000; see already Wallace 1971 and Héritier et al. 
1994). Moreover, the need to adapt domestically to European pressures may have 
significant return effects at the European level, where Member States seek to reduce the 
misfit between European and domestic arrangements (Dyson forthcoming; Jeffery 
forthcoming). 
One way of linking the bottom-up and top-down dimension in the relationship between the 
EU and its Member States is to focus on the role of national governments in the ascending 
(policy formulation decision-making) and descending (implementation) stage of the 
European policy process. This is not to say that supranational actors, such as the European 
Commission or the European Parliament, are irrelevant to European policy-making. Nor do 
member state governments necessarily gate-keep the access of domestic interests to the 
European policy arena. Nevertheless, national executives hold a key position in both the 
decision-making and the implementation of European policies and thus influence the way in 
which Member States shape European policies and institutions and adapt to. 
The European policy process can be conceptualized as a ‘reciprocal relationship’ (Andersen 
and Liefferink 1997: 10, 1998) between political negotiations at the domestic and the 
European level. At the domestic level, actors pressure their national executives to pursue 
policies at the European level that are favourable to their interests. At the European level, 
member state governments push for European policies that satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing their adverse consequences at the domestic level (Putnam 1988: 434). 
Two-level game approaches establish a systematic relationship between domestic and 
European politics, with the national governments functioning as the core intermediators 
between the two. Furthermore, two-level game approaches provide a link between the 
ascending (decision-making) and the descending (implementation) stage of the European 
policy process. Except for treaty revisions, European decisions are legally binding for the 
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Member States and, hence, do not require ratification at the domestic level. Yet, while 
regulations are directly applicable, national parliaments must transpose directives into 
national law. Moreover, both regulations and transposed directives have to be practically 
applied and enforced by national administrations. Compliance problems with European 
policies often arise when public administrators or economic and societal actors are not 
willing to bear the implementation burden (Börzel 2000, 2003). They usually blame their 
national governments for the costs which European policies incur on them. At the same time, 
member state governments are held responsible by the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice, if European policies are not properly implemented and complied with. 
Consequently, member state governments tend to be rather cost sensitive in European 
policy-making. 
An effective strategy of maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of European 
policies is to ‘up-load’ or export national policies to the European level. First, ‘up-loading’ 
reduces the need for legal and administrative adaptation in ‘down-loading’, that is, 
incorporating European policies into national policy structures. The more a European policy 
fits the domestic context, the lower the costs of adaptation in the implementation process. In 
the absence of an elaborate policy structure, misfitting European policies may still inflict 
significant costs since these structures have to be built-up in the first place. Second, ‘up-
loading’ prevents competitive disadvantages for domestic industry. Imposing strict standards 
on lower-regulating Member States maintains the competitive situation of the industry in 
higher-regulating countries. Likewise, European liberalization and deregulation policies open 
new markets for industries from low-regulating countries that benefit from lower production 
costs. Finally, ‘up-loading’ may enable national governments to address problems which 
preoccupy their constituencies but cannot be effectively dealt with at the domestic level 
anymore (e.g. organized crime, environmental pollution, immigration). 
Member States share a general incentive to up-load their policy arrangements to the 
European level. But since they have distinct social, political, and economic institutions, they 
often compete for policies that conform to the preferences of their constituencies (Héritier 
1996). Thus, the British government, which runs a country with a rather open economy, may 
push for liberalization and deregulation in a policy sector. The French government, by 
contrast, wishes to defend its traditional approach of protecting certain industries from 
external competition (Ambler and Reichert 2001). Likewise, high-regulating countries seek to 
harmonize their strict social or environmental standards at the European level where they 
may meet the vigorous opposition of industrial latecomers which want to avoid competitive 
disadvantages for their industry. But not only do member state governments pursue 
diverging and often competing policy preferences. They also differ in their capacity to 
successfully engage in the European policy contest.  
In environmental policy, the Northern European ‘first-comers’ (Denmark, Netherlands, 
Germany, Sweden, Finland, Austria) not only have a strong incentive to export their strict 
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environmental standards to the European level to avoid competitive disadvantages for their 
industries and adaptations of their regulatory structures. They also have the action capacity 
(resources) to actively shape European policies according to their environmental concerns 
and economic interests. The Southern European ‘late-comers’ (Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Italy) lack both the policies and the action capacity (money, staff-power, expertise, 
administrative coordination) to upload them to the European level (cf. Börzel 2002a, 2003). 
Since they are policy takers rather than policy makers, the Southern Member States are far 
more likely to run into serious policy misfit than the Northern pace-setters. The result is a 
somewhat paradoxical situation where those Member States with the most limited policy-
making capacities bear the highest implementation costs since they have to adapt their 
domestic policies and institutions much more than their Northern counterparts. 
The regulatory contest in European (environmental) policy-making illustrates the interactive 
and recursive nature of the relationship between the EU and its Member States, where 
bottom-up dynamics in the EU policy process have serious implications for explaining the 
domestic impact of European policies on the Member States. Others have made similar 
arguments about a ‘competition among different national modes of governance’, where 
‘Member States aim to reduce their adaptation costs by transferring their national modes of 
governance to the European level’ (Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999: 271; cf. Bulmer 1997; 
Bulmer, Jeffery, and Paterson 2000). Future research should systematically explore the links 
and feedback loops between the bottom-up and top-down dimension of the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States. 
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